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Amendment: Lost History
Nina Morais
I tink dat 'twixt de niggers of de Souf and de womin at de Norf, all
talkin' 'bout rights, de white man will be in a fix pretty soon.
-Sojourner Truth, 18511
Courts and legal scholars agree that the Fourteenth Amendment should
be used to determine the legality of state actions that discriminate on the
basis of sex.' This consensus rests on the Fourteenth Amendment's broad
language,' not on the intent of its framers: Most people believe that the
framers had an overriding interest in prohibiting racial discrimination, but
virtually no awareness that the Amendment might be applied to sex dis-
crimination.' This Note questions the accuracy of this consensus view by
1. THE CONCISE HISTORY OF WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE 6 (M. Buhle & P. Buhle eds. 1978) [herein-
after CHWS].
2. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 642-44 (11th ed. 1985) and cases cited therein.
Exceptions to the consensus on the Fourteenth Amendment are increasingly rare. See Judge Bork vs.
Himself- Evolution of His Views, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1987, at B14, col. 4, quoting Supreme Court
nominee Judge Robert Bork's June 1987 "Worldnet" broadcast ("I do think that the equal protection
clause probably should have been kept to things like race and ethnicity. When the Supreme Court
decided that having different drinking ages for young men and young women violated the equal pro-
tection clause, I thought that. . . was to trivialize the Constitution and to spread it to areas it did not
address."); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 11
(1971) (equal protection clause requires formal procedural equality and bars racial discrimina-
tion-nothing more); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Supreme
Court's equal protection decisions are unsupported except in area of law where framers meant clause
to apply: classifications based on race or national origin); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10
Otto) 303, 310 (1879) (purpose of Fourteenth Amendment was to prohibit race discrimination;
women but not blacks can be excluded from juries); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,
71 (1872) ("pervading purpose" of Fourteenth Amendment was to protect newly freed slaves).
3. See J. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 92 (1983) (language of Fourteenth Amendment supports inclusion of women and chil-
dren); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 60
(1955) (framers' decision to use general language not tied to race was conscious); see also Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 89 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (blacks are not only benefi-
ciaries of Amendment since language is deliberately general); id. at 128-29 (Swayne, J., dissenting)
(Amendment's language includes all persons; Court cannot interpolate limitation to racial claims
neither expressed nor implied). Only one scholar, John Hart Ely, has argued that the framers deliber-
ately intended the Fourteenth Amendment to reach discrimination not based on race. But the histori-
cal evidence he offered was too slim to support his argument. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIs-
TRUST 23-24 (1980).
4. See, e.g., J. BAER, supra note 3, at 89 (1983) (in congressional debates on Fourteenth Amend-
ment, there was "some agreement that it did not cover women"); Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an
Old Problem-The Role of the Intent of the Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U.L. REV. 811,
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exploring the Fourteenth Amendment's historical context and early inter-
pretation. The Note concludes that this clear-cut image of intent is belied
by a more complicated history.
Section I shows that during the debates over the Amendment, the fram-
ers were vigorously lobbied by the nation's leading suffragists, who peti-
tioned Congress to protest the use of the word "male" in the section of the
Amendment that deals with voting. The suffragists' petitions kept the
framers keenly aware of the battle for women's enfranchisement, and the
battle for women's rights in general. This version of the Fourteenth
Amendment's history differs from the usual image of the framers as so
preoccupied with racial discrimination that they were unaware of the de-
mands of other politically disadvantaged groups.
Section I argues further that any attempt to understand the framers'
intent must take into account their awareness of women's political con-
cerns. To the extent that the framers were familiar with the progressive
political culture of their day, they might easily have guessed that reform-
ers would press courts with the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment
was applicable to women as well as to blacks. In this historical context, it
is implausible that the framers wished the Amendment to apply only to
blacks, but never said so explicitly.
Section II describes the early interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In the 1870's, suffragists petitioned Congress to use the Amendment
to prevent the states from disfranchising women. Congress did not agree
that the Amendment guaranteed women the right to vote, but it did agree
that this question of sex discrimination should be decided under the
Amendment. In addition, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century courts
almost unanimously reached the same conclusion that Congress did in the
1870's: Sex discrimination cases may be decided under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
This Note argues that there is more than one plausible reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment's history. Legal arguments based on original in-
tent are persuasive only to the extent that the historical evidence is une-
quivocal. If the history supports several interpretations, as it does here,
original intent should be much less important. The current interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment in sex discrimination cases-specifically,
the intermediate level of scrutiny used in these cases-is in part based on
scholars' certainty that the framers never intended the Amendment to
reach sex discrimination.5 The history detailed below at least undermines
813 (1983) ("[T]here is no evidence that the [Fourteenth Amendment's] Framers intended to prohibit
state-imposed sex discrimination .. "); Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and
Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 161, 161 ("[Tlhe framers of the fourteenth amend-
ment did not contemplate sex equality."); Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex,
15 B.U.L. REv. 723, 725 (1935) ("[I]t cannot be contended that there was even the faintest shadow of
positive intent that the [Fourteenth Amendment] should apply to women.").
5. See infra note 78.
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this simplistic view of the framers' intent. It might also support a more
progressive interpretation of the Amendment in sex discrimination
cases-to the extent that certainty about the framers' intent determines
the level of scrutiny which courts apply.
I. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S FRAMING
A. The Congressional Debates
In the summer of 1865, Susan B. Anthony spotted a newspaper report
of a proposed version of the Fourteenth Amendment, a version much like
the one which was eventually ratified. The first section seemed agreeable.
It promised all persons due process and equal protection under the law,
and protected all citizens' privileges and immunities.6 The second section,
however, seemed a catastrophe for the cause of women's suffrage. Under
the second section, when a state denied men the right to vote, its basis of
representation was reduced by the ratio of men denied the vote to the total
number of men in the state.7 This section was designed to penalize South-
ern states that refused to enfranchise newly freed slaves.8 But because it
implied that only men could vote, Anthony and other suffragists believed
that it would constitutionalize women's disfranchisement.9 As Elizabeth
Cady Stanton put it, "If that word 'male' be inserted [into the Constitu-
tion], it will take us a century at least to get it out."10
As soon as Anthony and Stanton learned of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's proposed language, they began raising money and orchestrating
support for a campaign against the Amendment's second section. Anthony
and Stanton devoted their 1865 Christmas holidays to "writing letters and
addressing appeals and petitions to every part of the country."" A vitu-
perative debate over the Amendment's second section appeared in the na-
tion's newspapers,1 and the debate quickly reached the floor of Congress.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.").
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
8. H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 98 (1908).
9. A. LUrz, SUSAN B. ANTHONY: REBEL, CRUSADER, HUMANITARIAN 121 (1959). The Amend-
ment did not literally deny women the vote. It just penalized states for disfranchising men, but did not
penalize them for disfranchising women. The suffragists were alarmed by the Amendment's likely
practical effect: They were sure that it would provide constitutional justification for the status quo.
10. E. DuBoIs, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869, at 61 (1978), quoting letter from Stanton to Gerrit Smith,
January 1, 1866.
11. E. STANTON, EIGHTY YEARS AND MORE: REMINISCENCES 1815-1897, at 243 (1898).
12. See THE HISTORY OF WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE II (E. Stanton, S. Anthony & M. Gage eds.
1969) [hereinafter HWS]. The Albany Evening Journal pictured the Amendment's opponents with
"hook-billed noses, crow's-feet under their sunken eyes, . . . a mellow tinting of the hair. . . [and]
spectacles," and expressed pity for the "weaker vessels" who were their husbands. Id. at 101. The
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By January of 1866, more than 10,000 supporters of women's rights had
written to their Congressmen to protest the Fourteenth Amendment's sec-
ond section. According to the suffragist Carrie Chapman Catt, "Few Sen-
ators or Representatives escaped a bombardment of letters and petitions
urging that the nation should take no such backward step as to write the
word male into the Constitution."13 In addition, "[t]wice resolutions were
passed and delivered to Congress, fortifying the appeals that were being
sent by petition. An address to Congress prepared by Miss Anthony was
also. . . laid upon the desk of every Senator and Representative."' 14 This
paper deluge was then followed by "[i]nterviews with Congressmen, beg-
ging them to heed the petitions which were pouring in . ... ""
In Congress, the suffragists' arguments were usually received without
enthusiasm. 6 Nevertheless, historians say that the suffragists' campaign
"made its presence felt in the deliberations." 17 Petitions protesting the
Amendment's second section were presented on the floor of Congress at
least five times in January and February of 1866.18 On one occasion, de-
bate over the petitions was interrupted by so much applause from the
"large number of persons" in the galleries and the representatives on the
floor that the Speaker of the House had to reprimand both groups for
their lack of decorum. 9
The suffragists' palpable presence in Congress during the debates over
the Fourteenth Amendment indicates that the Amendment's framers were
kept aware of women's political concerns. It is true that the framers had
little respect for the suffragists' arguments and that black rights remained
New York Tribune was convinced that "the sure panacea for such ills as the. . . petitioners complain
of, is a wicker-work cradle and a dimple-checked baby." Id. The Nation dismissed the campaign,
declaring that many women did not really want suffrage. Id. at 102. The New York Independent,
however, railed against the injustice of the Fourteenth Amendment's second section, and other papers
printed letters from the suffragists themselves. Id. at 92-95.
13. C. CATrT & N. SHULER, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND POLITICS: THE INNER STORY OF THE
SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 37 (1923).
14. Id. at 39.
15. Id. at 41; see also J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 130 (1956)
(suffragists waged "a vigorous fight" against second section).
16. J. JAMES, supra note 15, at 130. Although the Republicans seemed the suffragists' natural
allies, few showed any but the most cursory interest in their cause. H. TREFOUSSE, THE RADICAL
REPUBLICANS 27 (1969). Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania refused to present a peti-
tion organized by Elizabeth Cady Stanton. See A. LUTz, supra note 9, at 118. Senator Charles Sum-
ner of Massachusetts presented one from her ally Lydia Maria Child under protest, remarking that it
was "most inopportune." HWS, supra note 12, at 95-97. So the suffragists turned to the Democrats,
who "treated the petitioners with respect, and called attention in every way to the question." Id. at
95. Historians believe, however, that the Democrats did so merely to harass the Republicans. J.
JAMES, supra note 15, at 62; G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 1076 (1962).
17. See, e.g., J. BAER, supra note 3, at 90.
18. Petitions were presented by Representative Brooks on January 23, Senator Brown on January
24, Senator Henderson on February 21, Senator Sumner in late February, and Senator Lane on an
unknown date. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 380, 390, 951-52 (1866); HWS, supra note 12,
at 96, 101.
19. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 380 (1866). The applause was sparked by Representa-
tive James Brooks, Democrat of New York, who commented that when it came to extending the
franchise he preferred white women to blacks. Id.
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uppermost in their minds. But if suffragist petitions jammed congressional
mailboxes and noisy women overflowed the galleries, it is difficult to ar-
gue, as many do, that the framers hadn't given much thought to the de-
mands of other politically disadvantaged groups.
Not only were the framers made aware of women's political concerns
by the suffragist's petitions; comments made during the debates also sug-
gest that many of them foresaw the use of the Fourteenth Amendment in
sex discrimination cases. According to one historian, "[o]pponents of the
amendment frequently pointed . . out" that "the language of Section I,
on its face, was broad enough to protect women as well as racial minori-
ties."' 20 But the threat that women might file sex discrimination suits did
not prevent a majority of Congress from supporting the Amendment. Nor
did it lead supporters to defend the Amendment by claiming that it did
not reach sex discrimination, even when they were pressed to do so.2 1
Comments made during the debates indicate that some of the framers
were not averse to women claiming rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's first section. Why, then, were the framers almost unanimously in-
different to the suffragists' protest against the Amendment's second sec-
tion? In 1866, many members of Congress perceived a great gulf between
civil rights, like the right to personal security or ownership of property,
and political rights, like the right to vote.22 Though the concept is foreign
to us, many framers believed that certain adults deserved civil rights, but
20. J. BAER, supra note 3, at 90.
21. In an attempt to dissuade the Amendment's supporters, Representative Robert Hale, Republi-
can of New York, argued that the Amendment's "vague, loose, and indefinite" language would violate
principles of federalism by giving Congress the power to legislate in areas traditionally reserved to the
states. For example, Hale said, the Fourteenth Amendment would give Congress the power to assure
married women the same property rights as men. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (1866).
Representative Thaddeus Stevens, one of the most prominent members of the committee that drafted
the Amendment, J. BAER, supra note 3, at 76, replied that as long as all married women were treated
alike, and all men were treated alike, then there would be no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Hale's apt rejoinder was that under Stevens' interpretation of the Amendment, states could treat
blacks differently from whites, as long as all blacks were treated alike. Id. Hale's point was hard to
dispute: The Fourteenth Amendment's loose language did seem to allow Congress to challenge differ-
ential treatment of women and men. Stevens' most effective reply would have been to claim that the
Amendment concerned only blacks and whites, but he did not use this argument.
If supporters had tried to defend the Amendment by claiming that it did not reach sex discrimina-
tion, they may have sparked protest from some of their colleagues: At least one framer implied during
the debates that sex discrimination claims were within the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
one exchange, Representative James Brooks, Democrat of New York, asked why women "are not
permitted to be represented under this resolution." Representative Roscoe Conkling of New York
replied "They are . . . I thought they were persons." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 379
(1866).
22. See H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT 1835-1875, at 299, 395-97 (1982) (describing nineteenth-century vision of three different levels
of rights which, ultimately, were granted to blacks in succession: first civil rights, like right to con-
tract, sue, travel, own property, enjoy protection from violence; then political rights, like voting and
officeholding; then social rights, like right to public accommodations, integrated public education, and
intermarriage); Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection
Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. HiST. 884, 886-88 (1987) (Recon-
struction lawmakers distinguished civil rights from political rights from social rights).
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not political rights.23 Many framers, then, could easily have tolerated neb-
ulous demands for "women's rights," and at the same time implacably
opposed women's suffrage.14 This theory is supported by evidence that
during debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, Congressmen restricted
their negative comments on women's rights to the question of the vote.25
These comments are quoted by scholars who wish to prove that the fram-
ers did not intend the Fourteenth Amendment to reach sex discrimina-
tion.28 But all that is certain about the framers intent is that most of them
did not want women to vote. When all the framers' comments on women
are read together, they suggest that women's rights, short of suffrage,
were thought to be within the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. The Political Context
The suffragists' presence in Congress during debates on the Fourteenth
Amendment alerted the framers to women's political concerns-alerted
them, in other words, to the Amendment's place in the political context of
the 1860's. This context may have colored the Amendment's meaning in
two ways. First, by 1866, as never before in American history, progressive
people considered women worthy of new rights, and moderates and con-
servatives at least knew that increasing numbers of women were eager to
acquire new rights. As a result, people of all political stripes assumed that
women would claim inclusion in any general grant of rights, unless they
23. Some members of the 39th Congress were more inclined to grant blacks civil rights than
political rights. As a result, the arguments in favor of the civil rights bills debated in 1866 focused on
the fact that the proposed legislation would not give blacks political rights. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Martin Thayer, Republican of Pennsylvania); id. at
1117 (remarks of Rep. James Wilson, Republican of Iowa).
By contrast, Congress did intend the Fourteenth Amendment to extend to political as well as civil
rights. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 33, 85. At first glance, this point might seem inconsistent
with the Note's argument that the framers did not preclude application of the Amendment to sex
discrimination-given that some of the framers clearly opposed giving political rights to women. The
two arguments, though, are not really inconsistent. The evidence suggests that there was a great deal
of support in the 39th Congress for equal civil rights for blacks; some support for equal political
rights for blacks and equal civil rights for women; and the least support for equal political rights for
women. We can argue, then, that the framers did not preclude application of the Amendment to either
political rights or sex discrimination, and still acknowledge that many framers opposed giving women
the vote-in other words, that they opposed extending the Amendment in both directions at once.
24. Many framers may have shared the views of Senator Matthew Carpenter-who was not yet
in Congress in 1866-who believed both that the Fourteenth Amendment did not guarantee women
the vote and that the amendment reached sex discrimination. In 1872, Senator Carpenter wrote a
report for the Senate Judiciary Committee which denied that women were guaranteed suffrage by the
Fourteenth Amendment. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. In the same year, Carpenter ar-
gued before the Supreme Court that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed women the right to prac-
tice law, saying, "[AIII the privileges and immunities which I vindicate to a colored citizen, I vindicate
to our mothers, our sisters, and our daughters." Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 137
(1872).
25. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 952 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Henderson); id. at 40
(remarks of Sen. Morrill); id. at 56 (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at 79 (remarks of Sen. Davis); id.
at 297 (remarks of Rep. Schenck).
26. See, e.g., J. BAER, supra note 3, at 91.
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were explicitly barred by the use of the word "male." Second, the ques-
tions of women's rights and black rights had been intertwined for many
years in the minds of suffragists and some abolitionists. These reformers
were therefore very likely to press courts with the claim that the Four-
teenth Amendment was equally applicable to women and blacks-as, in
fact, they did.2 Given that women were eager to claim new rights, and
that many reformers considered women's rights and black rights an indi-
visible cause, it seems implausible that the framers wished to limit the
Fourteenth Amendment to racial discrimination claims, but did not make
this limitation explicit.
Since the ground-breaking Seneca Falls Convention of 1848, the leaders
of the American women's movement had become increasingly adept at ar-
ticulating their demands and organizing support. The growing power of
the women's movement explains why the framers wrote the word "male"
into the Constitution in the first place. As one historian put it, "Two
decades of women's rights agitation had destroyed the centuries-old as-
sumption that political rights applied only to men. Accordingly, the Re-
publican authors of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . had to decide be-
tween enfranchising women or specifying male citizens as the basis of
representation. '28 In Elizabeth Cady Stanton's account, a friend privy to
the drafters' deliberations on the Amendment's second section related that
"[o]ne of the committee proposed 'persons' instead of 'males.' 'That will
never do,' said another, 'it would enfranchise wenches.' "29
Some framers did not wish to antagonize women by appearing to con-
stitutionalize their disfranchisement. But they knew that "the only way
they could open the constitutional door just wide enough to let the black
man pass in was to introduce the word 'male' into the national Constitu-
tion."'3 "Charles Sumner said, years afterward, that he wrote over
nineteen pages of foolscap to get rid of the word 'male' and yet keep 'ne-
gro suffrage' as a party measure intact; but it could not be done."3 1 Sena-
tor Sumner was not just wasting foolscap. Presumably the last thing he
wanted to see was a repeat of what had just befallen Australia:
Carelessly enough, [Australia's] male legislators omitted the signif-
icant adjective from their constitutional amendment, and, without a
27. See infra Section II.
28. E. DuBois, supra note 10, at 60.
29. E. STANTON, supra note 11, at 242.
30. Id.; see also C. CATT & N. SHULER, supra note 13, at 43-44 ("Every argument which could
be made for Negro suffrage applied to women. . . . The Negro was making little demand for the
vote. The women were making an unprecedented one. How to get the Negro in and keep the women
out constituted an ever present conundrum [for the Fourteenth Amendment's framers].").
31. Id. Sumner was not opposed to women's suffrage per se, but he feared that a constitutional
amendment which implied that women had the right to vote would never succeed in Congress. Like
most abolitionists, Sumner was willing to sacrifice women's suffrage in this, "the negro's hour." See
infra note 38.
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word of warning, on election day, every woman, properly qualified,
was found at the polls. There was no just reason for refusing them
the privilege, and The London Times says the precedent is to
stand.32
These accounts indicate that by 1866 increasing numbers of women as-
sumed that they were included in any general grant of rights, unless the
word "male" was explicitly used. This was not the assumption in earlier
years, so the word "male" had never before been written into the Consti-
tution.3" The word "male," of course, was not used in the Fourteenth
Amendment's first section. This omission might not have meant much in
1787. But these accounts of the framing indicate that the omission of the
word "male" and the use of the general terms "persons" and "citizens"
meant a great deal by 1866. When viewed in its political context, the
different language used in the Amendment's two sections supports the in-
terpretation proposed above: The framers were willing to allow the Four-
teenth Amendment to reach questions of women's rights, short of
suffrage.-"
Not only were many women thought to want new rights in 1866, but
anyone familiar with the progressive political culture of the day knew that
suffragists and some abolitionists considered women's rights intimately re-
lated to black rights. 5 Since the 1830's, reformers had spoken of slavery
32. HWS, supra note 12, at 102, (quoting Letter to The Nation from Caroline Healy DalI, Jan.
6, 1866). Some of the framers, at least the abolitionists among them, must have known that the same
problem had confronted the country's most prominent abolitionist organization in the late 1830's. The
American Anti-Slavery Society's constitution said that "persons" who supported it financially and
subscribed to its principles could be members. All members could vote, speak at meetings, and serve
on committees. Several years after the document was written a battle ensued, with one faction claim-
ing that women were persons, and the other relying on an original intent argument that the constitu-
tion's framers said "persons," but meant "men." Women were finally included in "persons" for the
purpose of interpreting the constitution, but the fight was so fierce that it permanently split the Soci-
ety in two. A. KRADrrOR, MEANS AND ENDS IN AMERICAN ABOUT-omSM 48-49 (1967).
33. This statement does not imply that all the rights guaranteed in the 1787 Constitution were
guaranteed only to men. Under the original Constitution, women had certain rights, like freedom of
speech, and did not have others, like suffrage. In 1787, there was no need to spell out the distinction,
because women were not so restive that they seemed likely to press courts to interpret generally
phrased constitutional guarantees in their favor. The difference was that by 1866 women were that
restive, and Congress knew it.
34. The difference between the language in section 1 and section 2 may be a particularly reliable
indicator of the framers' intent because there is evidence that the language of the two sections did not
differ accidentally. In an early version of the Amendment, the language of the two sections was quite
similar. An early first section prohibited discrimination because of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude. B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUC-
TION 83 (1914). An early second section reduced a state's basis of representation if it denied suffrage
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Id. at 84. But in the version of the Amend-
ment that was eventually presented to Congress, the language of the first section had changed consid-
erably, abandoning its narrow focus on race in favor of equal protection for all "persons." Id. at 106.
By contrast, the second section focused on race in both earlier and later versions: It always penalized
states for disfranchising blacks, but did not penalize them for disfranchising women. Id. at 84, 102.
The Amendment's drafters, then, deliberately altered the language of section 1, thereby distinguishing
it from section 2.
35. In the late 1830's, the abolitionist leader William Lloyd Garrison began to believe that the
doctrine of women's rights was "bound up with the cause of human freedom." G. BARNES, THE
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and women's predicament in the same breath. 6 When the Civil War be-
gan, Anthony and Stanton established the Women's National Loyalty
League so that the war would "be fought . . . not only for the one-sixth
in racial bondage but the one-half in sexual oppression." ' After the war,
the political bond between advocates of women's rights and advocates of
black rights began to disintegrate.3 " But this post-war rift was largely a
ANTISLAVERY IMPULSE 155 (1933). So Garrison announced that his paper, The Liberator, would
thenceforth advocate women's rights as well as abolition. R. NYE, WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND
THE HUMANITARIAN REFORMERS 113 (1955). Shortly thereafter, Garrison split the American Anti-
Slavery Society in a battle over women's right to full participation in society meetings, A. KRADITOR,
supra note 32, and he conspicuously joined his female allies when they were relegated to the gallery
in the 1840 London convention of the World Anti-Slavery Society. L. LADER, THE BOLD BRAHMINS:
NEW ENGLAND'S WAR AGAINST SLAVERY: 1831-1863, at 57 (1961). Frederick Douglass also saw
himself engaged in a struggle for human rights, not just black rights, and therefore took an active role
in the women's movement. Quarles, Abolition's Different Drummer: Frederick Douglass, in M.
DUBERMAN, THE ANTISLAVERY VANGUARD: NEW ESSAYS ON THE ABOLITIONISTS 123, 132-33
(1965). And at the Free Soil convention of 1852, Gerrit Smith and other abolitionists sought endorse-
ment of equal political rights for blacks and women-though only a handful of delegates actually
voted for the proposed plank. R. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERY POLITICS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1837-1860, at 245 (1976). Some historians claim that the abolitionists' adherence to
women's rights was only skin deep, see A. KRADITOR, supra note 32, at 53-59, and others emphasize
the views of abolitionists who thought that tangling women's rights with black rights was either politi-
cally hazardous, or wrong in principle. See R. WALTERS, AMERICAN REFORMERS 1815-1860, at 89
(1978); R. WALTERS, THE ANTISLAVERY APPEAL: AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM AFTER 1830, at 11-12
(1976); G. BARNES, supra, at 160.
36. Abby Kelley declared that she was grateful to the slave, because "[i]n striving to strike his
irons off, we found most surely that we were manacled ourselves." FREEDOM, FEMINISM AND THE
STATE: AN OVERVIEW OF INDIVIDUALIST FEMINISM 4 (W. McElroy ed. 1982) (quote undated).
Kelley's husband, Stephen Foster, remarked that "every family is a little embryo plantation, and every
woman is. . .in the eye of her husband. . . a slave, and the breeder of slaves." L. PERRY, RADICAL
ABOLITIONISM: ANARCHY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD IN ANTISLAVERY THOUGHT 230 (1973)
(quoting Speech by Stephen Foster, Rutland, Vermont Free Convention of 1858). Frances Gage won-
dered how anyone could expect an earnest anti-slavery effort "while nearly every man in the country
over twenty-five years of age owns one pair of hands." CHWS, supra note 1, at 6 (quoting Letter
from Frances Gage to The Liberator (Dec. 28, 1860)).
Participants at the Seneca Falls Convention later wrote of the year 1848: "At this time the condi-
tion of married women under the Common Law, was nearly as degraded as that of the slave on the
Southern plantation." CHWS, supra note 1, at 97. Sarah GrimkE compared Blackstone's statement
that women have no legal existence apart from their husbands to slaves' similar legal status. S.
GRIMK-, LETTERS ON THE EQUALITY OF THE SEXES AND THE CONDITION OF WOMEN 79-83 (Let-
ter XII) (1837). And Angelina Grimki stated the theoretical basis for all these comments: Wife-status
and slave-status were similarly intolerable because all people, black and white, women and men, had
the same rights. GrimkE, Human Rights Not Founded on Sex, in FREEDOM, FEMINISM AND THE
STATE, supra, at 29.
37. CHWS, supra note 1, at 193 (quoting the editors, not the suffragists). The League's initial
resolutions, adopted in New York City in May 1863, included a call for the practical establishment of
civil and political rights for all blacks and all women. CHWS, supra note 1, at 199. In debates over
this resolution, women spoke passionately, to loud applause, about the identification of the two causes.
Lucy Stone urged soldiers, "While you are going through this valley of humiliation, do not forget that
you must be true alike to the women and the negroes." Id. at 207. Ernestine Rose insisted that in "a
republic based upon freedom, woman, as well as the negro, should be recognized as an equal with the
whole human race." Id. at 202. Susan B. Anthony asked, "[I]s it possible for this Government to be a
true democracy, a genuine republic, while one-sixth or one-half of the people are disenfranchised?"
Id. at 203. And Angelina GrimkE added, "I rejoice exceedingly that that resolution should combine us
with the negro. I feel that we have been with him; that the iron has entered into our souls. True, we
have not felt the slave-holder's lash; true, we have not had our hands manacled, but our hearts have
been crushed." Id. at 202 (from speeches delivered in May and September, 1863). The resolution
uniting women's rights with black rights was carried by a large majority. Id. at 208.
38. After the war, national attention focused on black suffrage. Abolitionists suddenly distin-
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tactical dispute between abolitionist and suffragist leaders; women's rights
and black rights were still linked conceptually in the minds of many re-
formers. 9 In May 1866, one month before Congress voted on the Four-
teenth Amendment, suffragists and abolitionists gathered to reunite their
efforts. A new organization was founded, the American Equal Rights As-
sociation (A.E.R.A.), whose purpose was "burying the black man and the
woman in the citizen."4° One of the A.E.R.A.'s first acts was to send an
address to Congress to protest the second section of the Fourteenth
Amendment,41 because, as the address said, denying either women or
blacks the right to vote was a "violation[] of the republican idea." '42 The
organization's preamble and resolutions, which equated the political con-
dition and aspirations of women and blacks, were quoted in the popular
press.43 The A.E.R.A.'s philosophy was also expressed on the floor of
guished their primary goal, black rights, from their more general, less pressing goals, like women's
rights. E. DuBois, supra note 10, at 55. Wendell Phillips, in assuming the leadership of the powerful
American Anti-Slavery Society in 1865, announced, "This hour belongs to the negro." Id. at 59
(quoting American Antislavery Standard, May 13, 1865, at 2). Gerrit Smith, for many years a
crusader for black and women's rights, refused to sign a petition to Congress which asked that no
distinction be made between women and men in constitutional amendments which referred to suf-
frage. ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, SUSAN B. ANTHONY: CORRESPONDENCE, WRITINGS, SPEECHES
119-20 (E. Du Bois ed. 1981). A formal break between the suffragists and abolitionists occurred in
the spring of 1866, at a small meeting in Boston, when Wendell Phillips said that it was time to strike
the word "white," from the Constitution, but not the word "male." Theodore Tilton, editor of The
New York Independent and the suffragists' longtime ally, agreed. Anthony swept angrily from the
room, and Stanton later declared that she was through "boosting the Negro over her own head."
Anthony and Stanton decided that they would henceforth devote their energies only to women's suf-
frage. A. Lutz, supra note 9, at 120.
39. G. MYRDAL, supra note 16, at 1076. As Stanton described the link between women's rights
and black rights:
[Tihe disfranchised all make the same demand, and the same logic and justice that secures
suffrage to one class gives it to all. The struggle of the last thirty years has not been merely on
the black man as such, but on the broader ground of his humanity. . . .If our rulers have the
justice to give the black man suffrage, woman should avail herself of that new-bor virtue to
secure her rights ....
HWS, supra note 12, at 94-95 (quoting Letter to The Antislavery Standard (Dec. 26, 1865)).
40. HWS, supra note 12, at 174. While it lasted, the A.E.R.A. was an impressive organization.
Among its officers and activists, the largest group were women who had worked on women's rights for
two decades with the American Anti-Slavery Society, including Anthony, Stanton, Lucy Stone,
Lucretia Mott, Ernestine Rose, and Frances Gage. There were also prominent abolitionist men:
Henry Ward Beecher, one of the most powerful clergymen in the country, spoke at the A.E.R.A.'s
founding, and Frederick Douglass, Stephen Foster, Theodore Tilton and others were allied with the
organization throughout its short life. E. DuBois, supra note 10, at 67-68. These leaders were joined
by prominent women abolitionists who had not worked on women's rights before the war. Id. at 68.
The A.E.R.A. operated as a national organization, and also formed local groups in six states and
Washington, D.C. From these bases, the A.E.R.A. launched a series of lobbying and petitioning cam-
paigns to remove racial and sexual restrictions from the constitutions of six different states. These
included New York, where in 1867 the A.E.R.A. held meetings in each of the state's sixty counties
and presented 28,000 signatures to the delegates at a constitutional convention. Id. at 64-70. Three
years after the A.E.R.A. began, however, it succumbed to the same disagreements between suffragists
and abolitionists that had occasioned its founding. Id. at 77. See supra note 38 on the disagreements
between suffragists and abolitionists.
41. CHWS, supra note 1, at 226-29.
42. Id. at 228.
43. The New York Herald printed the A.E.R.A.'s preamble, including the statement that "negroes
and women now hold the same civil and political status, alike needing only the ballot." The Herald
also printed the association's resolutions, including the following: "[L]iberty and equality are the in-
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Congress at the same time that the Fourteenth Amendment was debated:
Considering a proposal that the District of Columbia extend suffrage to
women as well as to blacks, several members of Congress discussed the
similarity between the political conditions of the two groups."
The conceptual link between women's rights and black rights, first ar-
ticulated in the 1830's, held firm in the minds of reformers through the
spring of 1866. This link would have been apparent to any of the Four-
teenth Amendment's framers who read his mail, who read the popular
press, or who listened to his progressive colleagues. The framers might
easily have guessed, then, that reformers would read the Fourteenth
Amendment as equally applicable to women and blacks, and that they
would press courts to accept their interpretation.
Apparently, when the Fourteenth Amendment's framers wished to pry
women's rights from black rights, they felt compelled to use explicit lan-
guage; that is why they were careful to insert the word "male" into the
Amendment's second section. The Amendment's first section, however, re-
fers only to "persons" and "citizens." It would be natural to infer from
this textual difference alone that the framers were willing to allow the
Amendment's first section to reach sex discrimination. We can also say
that the Amendment's history supports this inference. The suffragists' pe-
titions and the Amendment's political context put the framers on notice
that some people would assume that the Amendment reached sex discrimi-
nation. Yet the framers did not explicitly preclude sex discrimination
claims. This suggests that scholars have spoken too quickly in arguing, for
example, that there was not "the faintest shadow of positive intent that
the [Fourteenth Amendment] should apply to women.""5
II. EARLY INTERPRETATIONS
Early interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme
Court, lower federal courts, state courts, and Congress-which included
many of the Amendment's framers-almost unanimously agreed that the
Amendment reached sex discrimination. Shortly after the Amendment's
ratification, Congress and the courts began hearing sex discrimination
herent rights of man in civilization; and no constitution or code should be accepted as law that does
not secure them to every citizen. The same arguments apply equally to both [negroes and women],
and prove that all partial legislation is death to republican institutions." New York Herald, May 11,
1866.
44. In the December 1865 debates on suffrage in the District of Columbia, Senator Cowan of
Pennsylvania said, "A great many reflections have been made upon the white race keeping the black
in slavery. I should like to know whether we have not partially kept the female sex in a condition of
slavery. . . ." HWS, supra note 12, at 105. In debates on the same issue in the House, Representa-
tive Boyer said, "If the negro has a natural right to vote because he is a human inhabitant of a
community professing to be republican, then women should vote for the same reason. . . ." CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1866), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DE-
BATES 101 (A. Avins ed. 1974).
45. Crozier, supra note 4.
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claims under the Fourteenth Amendment-in the sense that the merit of
these claims was determined by meticulous interpretation of the Amend-
ment's text and the Amendment's relation to other constitutional provi-
sions. Congress and the courts could not have reached these interpretive
issues without first deciding, as a threshold question, to hear sex discrimi-
nation claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. If the Fourteenth
Amendment simply did not reach sex discrimination, Congress and the
courts would have dismissed the petitions and lawsuits for reasons analo-
gous to the modem "failure to state a claim." But Congress and most
courts did not take this approach, suggesting that in the nineteenth cen-
tury no one doubted that the Amendment reached sex discrimination, at
least in theory.
A. Interpretations by Congress
After the defeat of the suffragists' campaign against the Fourteenth
Amendment's second section, the movement's leaders decided that the first
section was ripe for use. In 1870, Senator Ira Harris and Representative
George Julian presented a memorial to Congress from the suffragist Vic-
toria Woodhull. Woodhull asked that Congress use its power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent the states from disfranchising
women. 6 The memorial was referred to the House Judiciary Committee,
which issued majority and minority reports in 1871."' Neither report, nor
a report on the same question issued in 1872 by the Senate Judiciary
Committee,4" so much as suggested that sex discrimination was beyond
the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Both the House Judiciary Committee's majority report and the Senate
Judiciary Committee's report concluded that denying women the vote did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The House Committee's majority
report argued that women were citizens, but that voting was not a "privi-
46. HWS, supra note 12, at 443-44. In addition to presenting memorials to Congress, suffragists
also cast over a hundred ballots in 1871 and 1872, believing that the Fourteenth Amendment had
given them the right to vote. Hoff-Wilson, The Legal Status of Women in the Late Nineteenth and
Early Twentieth Centuries, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS 125, 130 (1977). In 1870, black women voted in South
Carolina, encouraged to do so by federal agents. According to one historian, "that [women] attempted
to vote and were permitted to do so by elections officials suggests [that the suffragists' interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment was] widespread, even popular." DuBois, Outgrowing the Compact of the
Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 74 J. AM. HiST. 836,
853 (1978).
47. H.R. REP. No. 22, CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. (Jan. 30, 1871) (written by Rep.
John Bingham), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 44, at
466-67 [hereinafter HOUSE MAJORITY REPORT]; H.R. REP. No. 22, pt. 2, CONG. GLOBE, 41st
Cong., 3d Sess. (Feb. 1, 1871) (written by Reps. William Loughridge and Benjamin Butler), re-
printed in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 44, 467-71 [hereinafter
HOUSE MINORITY REPORT].
48. S. REP. No. 21, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 25, 1872) (written by Sen. Mat-
thew Carpenter), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 44, at
572-73 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
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lege or immunity" guaranteed to citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment.4
Both the House Committee's majority report and Senate Committee's re-
port also argued that the states' ability to disfranchise women was implied
by the Fourteenth Amendment's second section and the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. The former, they said, was riddled with the word "male." The
latter prevented states from denying the vote on the basis of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude, implying that states could deny the vote on
any other grounds.5" The Senate Committee's report argued further that
the Fifteenth Amendment would have been superfluous if the Fourteenth
Amendment had guaranteed citizens the right to vote.51
The House Committee's minority report agreed with the suffragists
that denying women the vote violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The
report argued that all the privileges and immunities due men were due
women as well; that voting was a privilege or immunity guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment; and that women were not implicitly dis-
franchised by the Fourteenth Amendment's second section or the Fifteenth
Amendment.
The debate between the House Committee's majority report and the
Senate Committee's report, on the one hand, and the House Committee's
minority report, on the other hand, was quite limited in scope. It con-
cerned only whether voting was a privilege or immunity, and what the
Fifteenth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's second section
implied about women's suffrage. On one point all three reports were in
full, if implicit, agreement: The Fourteenth Amendment did reach sex
discrimination.
In addition to Congress' disposition of the suffragists' petitions, other
evidence from the 1870's indicates that many Congressmen believed the
Fourteenth Amendment reached sex discrimination. When Congress de-
bated a bill in 1874 that would have prohibited the exclusion of blacks
from a number of public institutions, including public schools,52 the bill's
proponents claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the
power to desegregate the schools. The bill's opponents disagreed. They
argued that if the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to put blacks
49. The majority report said that voting was not a privilege or immunity guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment because it was not among the privileges and immunities included in the original
Constitution. The following year, the Supreme Court agreed with the majority report: "privileges and
immunities" meant only those guaranteed by the original Constitution. Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). To decide whether voting was a privilege or immunity under the original
Constitution, the House Committee's majority report relied on the 1823 decision Corfield v. Coryell,
which included in its list of privileges and immunities "the elective franchise, as regulated and estab-
lished by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised." 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). According to the majority report, following Corfield v. Coryell, voting rights
were utterly dependent on state law and therefore were not a privilege or immunity. HOUSE MAJOR-
sTy REPORT, supra note 47.
50. Id.; SENATE REPORT, supra note 48.
51. Id. at 572.
52. CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 657 (1873).
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and whites in the same school, then the Amendment would allow Con-
gress to put girls and boys in the same school. "I should like to hear
anybody point out a legal difference," said one of the bill's opponents.83
The clear implication of this argument, offered repeatedly, was that the
Fourteenth Amendment applied to sex discrimination exactly as it applied
to race discrimination."'
Interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Judiciary Com-
mittees and individual Congressmen provide convincing evidence of the
framers' intent. Many members of Congress in the 1870's were in office
during the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 In addition, the
House Committee's majority report on Victoria Woodhull's petition was
written by Representative John Bingham, Republican of Ohio, the chief
draftsman of the Amendment's crucial first section. 6 In addressing the
suffragists' petitions, Bingham and others examined the Amendment's text
and its relation to other constitutional provisions rather than arguing that
the Amendment did not reach sex discrimination; and in debates over
school desegregation, Congressmen assumed that the Amendment applied
equally to women and blacks. In the 1870's, then, Congress apparently
believed that sex discrimination claims could be heard under the Four-
teenth Amendment.
53. Id. at 313 (1874) (remarks of Senator Merrimon).
54. See id. at 4171-72 ("I do not know that the fourteenth amendment enjoins upon us that we
shall have [racially] mixed schools. . . . I doubt if the fourteenth amendment provides that females
shall be intruded into male schools or males into female schools; and yet this would be the office of the
fourteenth amendment under the logic of the Senator from Vermont.") (remarks of Senator Sargent);
id. at 313 ("I cannot understand or comprehend a distinction in point of principle between the power
to educate the sexes in separate schools and that to require the races to be educated in separate
schools.") (remarks of Senator Merrimon); id. at 428 ("The 'equal protection of the laws' could not
have been designed for any such case. It could never have been contemplated that every citizen, male
and female, black and white, foreign and native, should be accorded the enjoyment of every right in
the same measure and in the same degree. Such a construction would invalidate all legislation which
separated the sexes in schools supported by public funds. ... ) (remarks of Representative Buck-
ner); see also id. at 359 (remarks of Senator Merrimon); id. at 343 (1873) (remarks of Representative
Beck); id. at 453 (remarks of Representative Atkins).
One proponent of the desegregation bill tried to dodge these arguments by claiming that the Four-
teenth Amendment reached only racial discrimination, not sex discrimination. Congress, he said,
therefore had the power to order racially integrated schools, but not sexually integrated schools. An
opponent of the bill replied, "[Tihe Constitution does not say anything about 'race' except in certain
respects. It provides expressly that there shall be no discrimination on account of race or color as to
the matter of voting. . . but there is no expression touching distinctions as to race in any other respect
whatsoever." Id. at 359 (remarks of Senator Merrimon).
55. Of the 74 Senators in January 1872, when the Senate report was written, 25, or one-third,
were in Congress during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment. Of the 257 Representatives in
January 1871, when the House reports were written, 49, or one-fifth, were in Congress during the
debates. BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, 1774-1971, at 184-87, 193-202
(1971). None of the Congressmen who discussed whether the Amendment applied to sex discrimina-
tion in the context of school desegregation were in Congress during the 1866 debates. Id. Their com-
ments, then, are not a direct clue to the framers' intent. But their comments, like early judicial inter-
pretations of the Amendment, do reveal how the framers' contemporaries perceived their intent.
56. Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 Wis. L.




The Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state courts heard a
number of sex discrimination claims under the Fourteenth Amendment in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These courts invariably
ruled against women plaintiffs, but, with a single exception, they did not
do so because the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Instead, in early cases decided under the privileges
and immunities clause, the validity of the women's claims was determined
by interpretation of the Amendment's text and its relation to other consti-
tutional provisions. In later cases decided under the equal protection and
due process clauses, courts decided that due to profound differences be-
tween the sexes, treating women and men differently was reasonable and
therefore did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Whichever clause
courts used, they always assumed that women could state claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and they always used standard Fourteenth
Amendment analysis to determine the validity of these claims.
In the first sex discrimination case, Bradwell v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court decided that denying women admission to the bar did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment." Bradwell is remembered as an example of
the Court's unwillingness to entertain sex discrimination claims under the
Amendment,58 but this was not, in fact, what the case was about. The
Court denied only one of Bradwell's claims: that admission to the bar was
a privilege or immunity guaranteed to citizens by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." The Court did not deny Bradwell's other claim: that the Four-
teenth Amendment protected the rights of women as well as blacks. As
Bradwell's counsel stated the issue to the Court:
[A] State legislature could not, in enumerating the qualifications [for
the bar], require the candidate to be a white citizen. This would be
the exclusion of all colored citizens, without regard to age, character,
or learning. Yet no sound mind can draw a distinction between such
an act and a custom, usage, or law of a State, which denies this
privilege to all female citizens, without regard to age, character, or
learning. . . . [I]f [the privileges and immunities clause] does protect
57. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872); see also In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894) (privileges and
immunities clause was not violated when woman was denied admission to bar).
58. See, e.g., K. DECROW, SEXIST JUSTICE 36 (1974) ("Until 1971, the Supreme Court had
never decreed that women are 'persons' under the law and entitled to its equal protection."); L.
WARSOFF, FQUALITY AND THE LAW 199 (1938) ("Just about one hundred pages earlier, in the same
volume of the reports, Mr. Justice Miller decided the Slaughter-House Cases in which he made the
statement that he doubted very much whether any state action not directed toward discrimination
against the Negro, would ever come within the purview of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Naturally enough, the petition in the [Bradwell] case was dismissed.").
59. Id. at 139.
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the colored citizen, then it protects every citizen, black or white, male
or female.60
Bradwell's counsel challenged the Court to limit the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to racial discrimination. And though the Court had declared just a
few pages earlier in the Slaughter-House Cases that the Amendment's
pervading purpose was to protect blacks,6 it declined to decide Bradwell
on that ground.
A second Supreme Court case from the 1870's, Minor v. Happersett,2
was decided in much the same way as Bradwell. Minor claimed that the
Fourteenth Amendment gave her the right to vote. The Court disagreed,
basing its decision on the same arguments that the House and Senate Ju-
diciary Committees had used to answer the suffragists' petitions.6 3 As in
Bradwell, the Court never questioned the propriety of hearing Minor's
sex discrimination claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, the
Court believed that it could decide the case "upon other grounds," but
agreed to decide it under the Fourteenth Amendment, as Minor requested,
because "the question is fairly made. ' ' "
In the 1870's, lower federal courts also heard a number of women's
suffrage cases under the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The most celebrated
was Susan B. Anthony's 1873 criminal trial for voting. Anthony claimed
that "[i]t has never, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
been questioned. . . that women as well as men are included in the terms
of its first section, nor that the same 'privileges and immunities of citizens'
are equally secured to both."..6 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ward Hunt,
riding circuit, agreed. He heard the case under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, stating explicitly that "[t]he thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
amendments were designed mainly for the protection of the newly emanci-
pated negroes, but full effect must, nevertheless, be given to the language
employed." '67 So the Fourteenth Amendment did reach sex discrimina-
tion-but there Anthony and Justice Hunt parted company. Hunt be-
lieved that privileges and immunities included only those rights guaran-
teed by the federal Constitution. Therefore suffrage, a right arising under
60. Id. at 135-36.
61. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872).
62. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
63. See text accompanying notes 49-51.The Minor Court said that although women were citizens,
voting was not a privilege or immunity guaranteed to citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment. It also
said that both the Fourteenth Amendment's second section and the Fifteenth Amendment implied that
the Fourteenth Amendment's first section did not guarantee all citizens the right to vote. Id. at
170-75.
64. Id. at 165.
65. HWS, supra note 12, at 507.
66. ACCOUNT OF THE PROCEEDINGS ON THE TRIAL OF SUSAN B. ANTHONY 36 (1874).
67. 24 F. Cas. 829, 829 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 14,459).
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state constitutions, was not protected by the privileges and immunities
clause."8
In the nineteenth century, at least three state supreme courts also heard
sex discrimination claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.6" In only one
of these cases, decided in 1882 by the Wyoming Supreme Court, did a
court say that a sex discrimination claim could not be heard under the
Fourteenth Amendment because the Amendment prohibited racial dis-
crimination but not sex discrimination. In the light of Bradwell and Mi-
nor, it appears that the Wyoming Supreme Court was not only short-
sighted about the future; it was also bucking precedent.
In the early twentieth century, courts at all levels continued to hear sex
discrimination claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, but with one dif-
ference: Because the Supreme Court held in 1872 that the privileges and
immunities clause added nothing to the rights guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion's original text,70 lawyers challenging both sex discrimination and ra-
cial discrimination abandoned the privileges and immunities clause and
began to use the equal protection and due process clauses. 1 Still, chal-
lenges to sex discrimination were invariably denied. 2 Under the equal
68. Id. at 830.
69. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld an ordinance preventing liquor sellers from employing
women other than their wives, without stating reasons. Bergman v. Cleveland, 39 Ohio St. 651
(1884); see also In re Considine 83 F. 157, 158 (C.C.D. Wash. 1897) (equal protection clause not
violated by statute forbidding women to work where liquor was sold, because law applied equally to
people similarly situated-implying that women and men are not similarly situated with respect to
liquor sales). The Indiana Supreme Court decided under state law that women should be admitted to
the bar, but included an aside indicating its willingness to hear sex discrimination claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The court said that women are citizens whose privileges and immunities
could not be abridged. It also said that women's right to practice law could not be denied simply
because the Constitution's framers might not have anticipated that women would someday wish to
practice law. In re Petition of Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 670, 667 (1893). The Wyoming Supreme Court
upheld the exclusion of women from a jury because the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
prohibit racial discrimination, not sex discrimination. McKinney v. State, 3 Wyo. 719, 725-27 (1892).
70. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 417 (Slaughter-
House Cases eviscerated privileges and immunities clause); J. ELY, supra note 3, at 22-23 (same); R.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY 37-38 (1977) (same).
71. The history of the Fourteenth Amendment's use in racial discrimination cases parallels the
history of its use in sex discrimination cases. For a few years after the Slaughter-House Cases, law-
yers in racial discrimination cases, like the lawyers for Bradwell and Minor, stubbornly tried to
breathe life back into the privileges and immunities clause. See, e.g., Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90
(1875). But when these claims did not succeed, lawyers in racial discrimination cases, like lawyers in
sex discrimination cases, began making claims under the amendment's other clauses. See, e.g.,
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
72. The Supreme Court upheld laws that forbade selling liquor to women, Cronin v. Adams, 192
U.S. 108 (1904); that taxed female and male laundry operators at different rates, Quong Wing v.
Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912); that limited the number of hours women could work, Dominion
Hotel v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 265 (1919); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914); Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); that prohibited the employment of women in big-city restaurants at
night, Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924); that established a minimum wage for women but
not for men, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); that levied a poll tax on men but
not women, Brcedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937); that forbade women to bartend unless they
were wives or daughters of male bar owners, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); and that
allowed women to volunteer for juries but did not press them into service, Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S.
57 (1961).
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protection and due process clauses, laws that treated women and men dif-
ferently were held unconstitutional only if different treatment seemed un-
reasonable or arbitrary. At that time, of course, women and men were
thought to be profoundly different creatures." Laws treating women and
men differently seemed perfectly reasonable, and therefore did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment. 4
It was not until the 1970's that the Court used the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to strike down differential treatment of women and men.7 ' But this
novel approach to sex discrimination was not the result of some doctrinal
leap; it was not even the result of doctrinal evolution. The Court's new
approach simply reflected changing social mores: Most classifications
based on sex now seemed unreasonable. In sum, what distinguishes the
sexist Fourteenth Amendment decisions of the 1870's from the feminist
Fourteenth Amendment decisions of the 1970's and 1980's is simply
judges' view of women. The doctrine-courts' willingness to judge differ-
ential treatment of women and men under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment-has an unbroken history stretching back almost to the Amend-
ment's ratification.
III. CONCLUSION
The evidence presented above shows that the Fourteenth Amendment's
history is open to interpretation. It might be read to support the consensus
view that the framers did not intend the Amendment to reach sex discrim-
ination. After all, one could argue that the evidence presented in this Note
is merely circumstantial, and that few Congressmen in the 1860's would
deliberately have lent constitutional support to a cause that was still con-
sidered fairly radical. Yet, as this Note argues, scholars may have reached
this conclusion too hastily.
In order to decide which interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
history is valid, it is crucial to know what is meant by intent. Some courts
73. See, e.g., Quong Wing, 223 U.S. at 63 ("If Montana deems it advisable to put a lighter
burden upon women than upon men with regard to an employment that our people commonly regard
as more appropriate for the former, the Fourteenth Amendment does not interfere by creating a ficti-
tious equality where there is a real difference."); Muller, 208 U.S. at 422 ("Differentiated by [physi-
cal structure and maternal functions] from the other sex, she is properly placed in a class by herself,
and legislation designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not neces-
sary for men and could not be sustained.").
74. Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 62 (not requiring women to serve on juries is reasonable because of their
"special responsibilities" for home and children); Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 466-67 (law forbidding
women to bartend did not create unreasonable classification); Radice, 264 U.S. at 296 (prohibiting
women from working in big-city restaurants at night is not unreasonable or arbitrary).
75. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the high-water mark of the Supreme
Court's willingness to disallow differential treatment of women and men. In striking down a rule that
allowed male air force employees to claim wives as dependents, but forced female employees to meet
special requirements to claim husbands as dependents, a plurality elevated women to suspect-class
status.
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might believe that the relevant intent is the framers' "general" intent."6
These courts would be impressed by evidence of the framers' general
awareness that the Fourteenth Amendment would be used in sex discrimi-
nation cases. They would consider irrelevant the framers' specific under-
standing of sexual equality: that is, the framers' view of which particular
rights and responsibilities should be shared equally by women and men.
For example, courts concerned with general intent would consider it cru-
cial that in the 1870's Congress used the Fourteenth Amendment to deter-
mine the validity of the suffragists' claims. It would not much matter to
these courts that the suffragists' petitions were ultimately denied.77
A court's willingness to rely on general intent would maximize the
practical effect of the evidence presented in this Note. 8 But even if this
76. This Note does not pretend to add to the lively debate over "general" intent. It merely argues
that a court willing to rely on general intent might use the evidence presented in the Note to justify an
expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment in sex discrimination cases. See infra note 78. For more on
the general intent debate, compare R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1978) (distin-
guishing general "concepts" such as equality from particular "conceptions" of what constitutes equal-
ity in a given situation); and A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 102 (1962) (seeking
specific answers to specific present-day problems is the wrong question to ask of historical materials
relevant to the framing); and Amar, A Neofederalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.L. REV. 205, 258 n.169 (1985) (Fourteenth Amendment's open-ended
language invites higher level of interpretive generality than Article III's precise language) with R.
BERGER, supra note 70, at 13-19 ("generality" of equal protection guarantee is strictly circumscribed
by framers' racial prejudice) and with Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Inter-
pretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 791-92 (1983) (no principled basis exists
for choice of level of generality).
77. If courts were to rely on the framers' general intent, sex discrimination cases might be seen as
analogous to racial discrimination cases involving desegregation or jury service. In desegregation cases,
for example, courts are said to rely on the framers' general guarantee of racial equality, even though
most of the framers were too bigoted to favor the particular remedy of desegregation. See Bickel,
supra note 3, at 61-64. Similarly, courts could rely on evidence of the framers' general awareness that
the Fourteenth Amendment would be used in sex discrimination cases. As in race cases, evidence of
the framers' general willingness to allow sex discrimination claims would permit courts to replace the
framers' specific understanding of what constitutes sexual equality with a more modern view.
This analogy between sex discrimination and racial discrimination is not perfect. Even if a court
were concerned primarily with general intent, it still might find that framers' general intent toward
women differed significantly from their general intent toward blacks. Congressmen spoke of blacks
constantly during the framing and actively imagined how blacks might use the Amendment. With
women, however, the evidence merely shows that many framers intended not to preclude women's use
of the Amendment. Even a court willing to focus on general intent, then, might use a perceptible
difference in the intensity of the framers' general intent to justify different levels of scrutiny in sex
discrimination and racial discrimination cases.
One could, however, counter this argument by imagining an even higher level of interpretive gener-
ality on which the analogy between women and blacks would seem more exact. On this level of
generality, the difference in intensity between the framers' intent toward women and their intent
toward blacks would itself seem a matter of specific intent. As such, this difference in intensity could
legitimately be ignored by modem courts that wished to pursue sexual and racial equality with the
same degree of commitment. See infra note 78.
78. If courts were willing to rely on the framers' general intent, they might use this evidence to
read the Fourteenth Amendment more expansively than they have done so far in sex discrimination
cases. Today, sex discrimination claims are examined with an "intermediate" level of scrutiny. Courts
require the government to justify sex-based classifications by showing that the classification is more
than just a reasonable way to reach a legitimate goal. The government does not, however, have to
show that the classification is a necessary way to reach a compelling goal, as it would under the more
exacting "strict scrutiny" standard used in racial discrimination cases. Seee.g., Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976). This intermediate level of scrutiny is used in part because women have not been able
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evidence falls short of proving the sort of intent that would influence a
court's disposition of sex discrimination claims in the near future, it is
valuable in a subtler way. The consensus view that the Fourteenth
Amendment should reach sex discrimination is now thought to be sup-
ported only by the Amendment's language."9 If the framers' intent can
plausibly provide additional support, then this view will stand even more
firmly. As recently as last year, the consensus was challenged in public
debate.80 The claim that the framers' intent should preclude the use of the
Fourteenth Amendment in sex discrimination cases could someday resur-
face; it could even begin to influence courts. The consensus view is only as
sturdy as the arguments that support it. The evidence presented above
reinforces the consensus view by suggesting that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's history, as well as its text, justifies the confident use of the Amend-
ment in sex discrimination cases.
to lay claim to the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers. See generally Note, Sex Discrimi-
nation and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1499,
1509 (1971). If a court were to focus on general intent, it could use the evidence presented above to
conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment's framers were willing to allow the amendment to reach sex
discrimination. This conclusion, in turn, could help justify using strict scrutiny in sex discrimination
cases.
79. See supra note 3.
80. See supra note 2.
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